Minimum quality standards are used extensively to solve quality problems in markets su¤ering from asymmetric information. Using a unique national panel over the 1996 -2005 period, this paper estimates the impact of minimum sta¢ ng requirements on the United States nursing home market. To consistently identify the impact of regulatory policies, various speci…cations are employed and compared to provide comprehensive controls for unobserved heterogeneity across states and time. We …nd signi…cant preference for the dynamic speci…cation as compared to the …xed e¤ect and the random trend speci…cation. Our result shows that given an increase of 0.5 hours of minimum sta¢ ng of licensed nurses, the quality of patient care is increased by 15 percent. Minimum sta¢ ng requirements for direct care nurses do not have any signi…cant e¤ect on quality. Detailed explanations for this lack of impact are also discussed.
1 The older population -persons ages 65 or older -numbered 37.9 million in 2007, which represented 12.6% of the U.S. population, over one in every eight Americans. By 2030, there will be about 72.1 million older persons, almost twice their number in 2007. In 2007, 4.4 percent (1.57 million) of the 65+ population lived in institutional settings such as nursing homes. The percentage increases dramatically with age, ranging from 1.3% for persons 65-74 years to 4.1% for persons 75-84 years and 15.1% for persons 85+ (Administration on Aging, 2008) . 2 For example, drugs must satisfy federal safety standards and many professions have to pass the state examinations and ful…ll a series of requirements to be certi…ed or licensed.
3 Leland (1979) , Shapiro (1986) , Ronnen (1991) , Crampes and Hollander (1995) , Valletti (2000) , Jinji and Toshimitsu (2004) .
4 Wiggins(1981) shows that drug regulation reduces the rate of introduction and R&D. Carroll and Gaston (1981) …nd that licensing restriction reduces the provision of seven professional services, including dentists. Gormley (1991) shows that quality regulations lower the number of child care centers. Lowenberg and Tinnin (1992) …nd similar results in the child care market. on quality have been limited. 5 One di¢ culty in empirically investigating MQS is the data constraint. Data on quality information is hard to observe, which is particularly true in markets with asymmetric information. Previous work typically relies on inputs or outputs alone as indicators of quality. This type of quality measure is problematic without risk adjustment for heterogeneity across examined observations. 6 However, data required for risk adjustment is usually hard to obtain. In addition to the issue of quality measure, the lack of variation in regulatory policies causes identi…cation problems. To address this, some previous work has analyzed policy variations across states all over the country. One disadvantage of those works is that they tend to ignore the potential endogeneity problem caused by unobserved heterogeneity across states. This unobserved heterogeneity has raised an additional di¢ culty for empirical work. Quite a few works 7 have employed panel data to correct for unobserved heterogeneity using …xed e¤ects. However, their estimation assumes that policy changes are exogenous once those time-invariant individual …xed e¤ects have been taken into account. Further investigation is needed either to defend or to relax this assumption.
Given the issues of data constraint and its resulting methodology constraint, the nursing home industry seems to provide an ideal setting to examine the causal e¤ects of minimum quality standards on market outcomes. One unique feature of our study is that we have a panel of observations covering almost all the nursing homes in the U.S. and over a long time period (1996 to 2005) . The quality measure used in this study is based on professional survey teams' assessment of both the process and outcome of nursing home care, which provides reliable and valuable quality information. 8 Moreover, regulatory variation observed across 5 Papers citing quality improvement include Holen (1978) , Chipty and Witte (1995) , Hotz and Xiao (2005) and Chen (2008) . Papers showing deteriorating quality are Carroll and Gaston (1981) , Chipty and Witte (1999) , and Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) . 6 Using the number of physician visits is an example of output related quality measure. It may be inappropriate without controlling for the sickness of patients.
7 Currie and Hotz (2004) , Hotz and Xiao (2005) , Siebert and Graevenitz (2005) and Chen(2008) . 8 To be more speci…c, a survey team follows the federal standards to evaluate each surveyed nursing home. If the nursing home fails to meet any certain standard, one corresponding de…ciency citation will be issued. Our quality measure is based on the number of de…ciency citations and the severity level of each violation. A higher number of de…ciency citations and a higher level of violations indicate lower quality of care.
states and time in the nursing home industry helps to precisely identify policy impacts.
Any analysis of policy impacts raises the question of endogeneity. Taking advantage of our unique dataset, this paper has employed various speci…cations to address the potential endogeneity problem caused by unobserved heterogeneity. It …rst adopts a model with …xed e¤ects speci…cation (speci…cation (1)), which takes into account the permanent di¤erences across states that are unobserved but are likely to be correlated with policy variables. One disadvantage of this speci…cation is that it assumes away any time-varying individual attributes or unobservables, the resulting being that the endogeneity problem may persist. As a remedy, the basic speci…cation is extended in two ways. First, individual heterogeneity that in ‡uences policy variables may follow individual speci…c trends. For example, a state's increasing sensitivity to quality issues may have caused more stringent inspections during each survey (hence systematically lower measures of quality) and more strict minimum sta¢ ng requirements. Ignoring this heterogeneity would confound the estimates for policy impacts.
The random trends speci…cation (speci…cation (2)) attempts to mitigate this potential bias by adding market speci…c trends. Second, unobserved heterogeneity may exhibit more complex dynamic behavior. To address this issue, the dynamic speci…cation (speci…cation (3)) introduces the lagged dependent variable and allows for the possibility that policy changes may be related to those lagged variables. As a …nal extension, speci…cation (2) and (3) are estimated adding a policy lead dummy indicating whether there will be any policy changes in the subsequent year. This is to check the possibility of any reverse causality from the left-hand side variables to policy changes. In the end, speci…cation (3), which includes the lagged dependent variable, turns out to be our preferred model. Speci…cation (2) has delivered quite similar results, except for the case where quality is measured as the weighted value of de…ciency citations.
MQS regulation imposed in the nursing home industry is characterized by minimum nursing hours per patient day for licensed nurses and direct care nurses. As di¤erent categories of nurses a¤ect the care of residents in di¤erent ways (Grabowski (2001) ), I examine the impact of MQS separately for licensed nurses and direct care nurses. Estimations from the dynamic speci…cation have found minimum sta¢ ng to have no signi…cant e¤ect on the number of nursing homes, contrary to, for example, the child care industry. This is probable, given that entry into the industry has already been heavily regulated by the government. With regard to policy impacts on quality of care, minimum sta¢ ng requirement for licensed nurses is shown to improve quality. To be more speci…c, an half hour increase of minimum sta¢ ng requirements for licensed nurses increases quality by 15 percent if quality is measured by the count of citations, and by 20 percent if quality is measured by the value of citations which takes into account di¤erential severity in violation. Minimum sta¢ ng requirements for direct care nurses are seen here to have no signi…cant impact on quality.
In the case of direct care nurses, this lack of impact on quality of patient care is striking.
One possible explanation is the lack of strict training and certi…cation in the profession. The certi…cation for licensed nurses requires 2-3 years' education, whereas the certi…cation for direct care nurses is minimal and informal to a degree that quality is not guaranteed. This substandard training and certi…cation makes it possible for nursing homes to maintain their operating costs by substituting less-skilled and cheap labor for direct care nurses after the imposition of the minimum sta¢ ng requirements. As a result, although the quantity of direct care nursing input is increased, its quality deteriorates and low-quality sta¢ ng undermines quality of patient care. Mandating the quantity of nursing input does not necessarily improve quality of care.
Another possible explanation is based on how nursing homes strategically adjust their nursing inputs as response to minimum sta¢ ng requirements in a market with asymmetric information. I've found more compressed quality distribution after the imposition of minimum requirements for direct care nurses. As di¤erentiating becomes more costly after policy regulation increases the lower bound of nursing inputs, nursing homes choose only to meet the minimum sta¢ ng requirements imposed on direct care nurses. In the end, the average quality of care does not increase.
The remaining paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews previous literature on minimum quality standards. Then, the nursing home industry is brie ‡y described.
Section 4 explains the data and provides summary statistics. The model and econometric speci…cation are presented in Section 5 and the empirical results are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 discusses quality of care in the U.S. nursing homes and possible extensions or avenue for future work. The last section sets out the paper's conclusions.
Previous Literature

Theoretical Work
Minimum quality standards are considered a possible solution to the quality deterioration problem in markets with asymmetric information; there is a large theoretical literature examining their impacts. Arrow's work on minimum quality constraints in 1971 (focused on occupational licensing as applied to professions) highlights MQS's role in minimizing consumer uncertainty. This increased consumer con…dence in the quality of the licensed service in fact increases the overall demand for those services. Leland (1979) identi…es types of markets that are likely to bene…t from minimum quality standards. These markets usually share the following properties: great sensitivity to quality variations; low elasticity of demand; low marginal cost of providing quality and low value placed on low-quality service (Leland (1979) ). Shapiro (1983) , by contrast, demonstrates that some types of customers are worse o¤, either because their preferred quality services are no longer supplied or because prices rise after the imposition of minimum quality standards. Shapiro (1986) extends his previous work, noting that minimum quality regulation raises the average quality of service in the regulated market. Shapiro also concludes that the cost of raising service quality may be so great as to decrease aggregate consumer surplus, even though licensing bene…ts the segment of consumers that highly values quality. Di¤ering from the previous work which assumes a competitive environment, Ronnen (1991) models …rms in an oligopolistic market structure: …rms face quality-dependent …xed costs and compete in quality and price. Imposing a minimum quality standard leads both low quality and high quality …rms to raise quality.
The intuition is as follows. The disparity between qualities shrinks since low quality …rms raise quality to meet minimum quality standards. As a result, high quality …rms further raise quality to di¤erentiate themselves from low quality …rms and to alleviate price competition.
Ronnen shows that all the consumers are better o¤ with minimum quality standards enforced, because of better qualities and lower hedonic prices, which is di¤erent from previous results presented by Leland (1979) and Shapiro (1983 and 1986 ). Crampes and Hollander (1995) consider a similar setting but with quality-dependent variable costs. They di¤erentiate between mildly restrictive and excessively stringent minimum quality standards.
9 Their …ndings with regards to mildly restrictive quality standards are quite close to Leland (1979) in that social welfare increases when quality standards reduce the quality gap between …rms. However, the imposition of more stringent minimum quality standards can eliminate high quality …rms, with the result being a decrease in average market quality. Valletti (2000) shows that the e¤ect of mild minimum quality standards delicately depends on the form of competition between …rms. Di¤ering from previous work that assumes …rms compete in a Bertrand Game, his paper considers …rms as Cournot competitors.
He concludes that both low and high quality producers are worse o¤ under minimum quality standards and social welfare decreases. Jinji and Toshimitsu (2004) revisit minimum quality standards under a vertically di¤erentiated duopoly. The authors generalize models studied in Ronnen (1991) and Valletti (2000) and …nd that the results presented in those two works are quite robust.
9 Mildly restrictive standards are slightly above the quality that a low quality …rm would have chosen in the absence of regulation.
Empirical Work
Previous empirical works agree that the imposition of minimum quality standards has a negative impact on the number of regulated products or the number of suppliers in the regulated market. Wiggins (1981) …rst estimates the e¤ects of regulation on new drug introduction in the 1970s. Drug regulations have a major direct impact on introduction as well as a signi…cant indirect e¤ect through a reduction in research spending. More precisely, regulations have reduced drug introduction by roughly 60 percent. Carroll and Gaston (1981) study seven professional occupations, including electricians, dentists and plumbers.
They claim that for all occupations, government restrictions reduce the number of suppliers per capita. Gormley (1991) uses state level aggregate data from the child care market and shows that minimum quality standards, such as higher sta¤-child ratios and high square footage requirements, reduce the number of child care centers. Lowenberg and Tinnin (1992) also investigate the U.S. child care market; they conclude that stricter licensing rules are associated with lower levels of consumption of child care services. In their paper, service licensing raises entry cost into the industry and raises the supply price more than it increases consumer utility. In this sense, quality regulations bene…t producers more than consumers.
Previous empirical work on quality is limited and mixed. Holen (1978) studies restrictive dentist licensing regulations and shows that licensing increases quality of care by reducing the likelihood of adverse outcomes. However, Carroll and Gaston (1981) show that restrictive licensing may lower quality. In their study, excess demand (as a result of decreased supply) increases the market price for regulated service providers, forcing some customers to turn to unlicensed service providers. For example, they …nd that accident rates, measured by the number of unintended electrocutions, are higher in states with more stringent licensing requirements on electricians. Chipty and Witte (1995) use household level survey data to examine the e¤ect of minimum quality standards in the child care market. They …nd that regulations are binding and that they have economically large and statistically signi…cant e¤ects on the equilibrium price of child care service and quality (as measured as sta¤-child ratios). Regulations of di¤erent dimensions have various impacts on quality. For example, training requirements and group size regulations increase equilibrium quality but minimum sta¤-child ratio requirements signi…cantly reduce quality. Chipty and Witte (1999) study child care providers'response to minimum quality standards. They …nd support that minimum quality standards improve the average quality of child care in certain markets. But when regulatory intervention increases the probability of child care center closures, both the average and the maximum quality observed in the child care market decline. Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) use unique data on the dental health of incoming Air Force personnel to empirically analyze the e¤ects of varied licensing stringency across states. Unlike most of the previous work which uses input as the measure of quality, their paper de…nes quality in terms of output, namely, the frequency of visits. Their rationale is that an inferior dentist may require multiple attempts to …ll a tooth while a good dentist requires only one.
They …nd that tougher licensing improves quality and raises prices. Hotz and Xiao (2005) distinguish their study in two ways. They are the …rst to use a unique panel dataset of the child care market so that they can control for state and time …xed e¤ect. Second, they use child care accreditation data as the measure of quality. They …nd that higher sta¤-child ratio requirements act as a barrier to entry and reduce the number of operating child care centers.
Moreover, they show that the regulation of a higher sta¤-child ratio improves the average quality of the market due to the exit of low quality providers. The surviving child care centers also bene…t from this regulation by earning higher revenue and pro…t per employee. On the other hand, higher sta¤-education requirements have quite the opposite e¤ects: they do not deter entry and they lead to lower quality and lower pro…t. Based on these …ndings, the authors conclude that minimum quality standards governing di¤erent dimensions of quality may have con ‡icting e¤ects.
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There are quite a few papers examining nurse sta¢ ng levels and quality of care in the 10 Previous work in child care markets such as the work done by Chipty and Witte (1995) (2000), Schnelle and et al. (2004) , Mueller and et al. (2006) , Zhang and et al. (2006) . 12 The majority of nursing home residents were over age 65 and about 10 percent were under age 65 (Decker, 2005) . To be more speci…c, nursing home residents include the elderly with chronic disabilities; infants with multiple impairments; young adults with traumatic brain injury, or other physical disabilities; and individuals with short-term rehabilitation or sub-acute treatment needs. 13 To qualify for Medicare nursing home coverage, an individual must spend at least 3 full days in a hospital before entering a nursing home. Medicare only covers nursing care up to 100 days. The …rst 20 days of nursing care will be fully covered by Medicare and a co-payment will be charged for the remaining 80 days. The average paid Medicare nursing home stay was 23 days in 1997, only 1/5 of the allowable time.
14 Those …gures and …gures below are based on various reports from the American Health Care Association. 15 To qualify for Medicaid, the potential recipients must pass a means test -their income and assets must residents. Private and other sources paid for the remaining 23 percent of nursing home residents. As government sources pay for the majority of nursing home residents, it is plain to see how intimately involved the government is in the industry.
There has been widespread concern about nursing home residents receiving poor quality care. As a response, the Institute of Medicine published its landmark report in 1986 that called for major revisions in the way nursing home quality was monitored. Following their recommendation, Congress passed the Nursing Home Reform Amendment to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) in 1987. This amendment mandated new standards of care, including increased minimum sta¢ ng regulations and quality of care monitoring (Harrington & Carrillo (1999) ).
Besides the federal regulations of minimum nurse sta¢ ng, most states have imposed additional requirements. The highest overall sta¢ ng requirement was adopted in California, which requires 3.2 hours per resident day, excluding administrative nurses (Harrington (2001) (Harrington and et al., (2008) ).
To what extent has quality of care been a¤ected by regulatory policies? While the above statistics have provided valuable information, they must be interpreted cautiously. The confounding components inherent in the data need to be identi…ed and isolated if we are to accurately evaluate the impact of minimum sta¢ ng requirements on the quality of patient be lower than a certain level as determined by the individual state. 16 Due to extended negotiations with the nursing home industry, OBRA 1987 did not take e¤ect till 1995, 8 years after the passage of the law (Wiener, 2007). care.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data used in this study comes from three sources: (1) state regulatory policies, (2) Area Resource File (ARF) and the most recent U.S. Population Census. Consistent with previous work, the county is de…ned as a proxy for the nursing home market. 17 The county may be a reasonable approximation of the market for nursing home care given patterns of funding and resident origin (Gertler (1989) ). 18 This section explains each component of our data and provides descriptive statistics.
Nursing Home Regulations on Minimum Nurse Sta¢ ng
Data on statutes and regulations is mainly collected from previous literature, which provides historic regulations back to 1997. More recent regulations are obtained via the internet.
A Medicare and/or Medicaid certi…ed nursing home has to meet the minimum sta¢ ng levels set by the federal and state government. The federal Nursing Home Reform Act (NHRA), as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1987, sets minimum sta¢ ng levels for registered nurses (RNs) and licensed practical nurses (LPNs), and minimum educational training for nursing assistants (NAs). The NHRA requires Medicare and/or Medicaid certi…ed nursing homes to have: "a RN director of nursing; a RN on duty at least 8 hours a day, 7 days a week; a licensed nurse (RN or LPN) on duty the rest of the time; and a minimum of 75 hours of training for nurse's aides." The law also requires nursing homes 17 Most studies have used the county as a proxy for the nursing home market (e.g., Cohen and Spector, 1996; Nyman, 1985; Zinn, 1993) .
18 Gertler (1989) shows that 75 percent of nursing home residents in New York State had previously lived in the county where the home was located. Nyman (1989) …nds 80 percent of residents in Wisconsin facilities chose a nursing home located in the same county of residence. A most recent study by Mehta (2006) …nds a strong inclination for residents to stay in a nursing home closer to their home. Simulation results suggest that the county is a good proxy for the market and that all …rms within that area can be assumed to compete equally (Mehta, 2006) . "to provide su¢ cient sta¤ and services to attain or maintain the highest possible level of physical, mental, and psychological well being of each resident" (OBRA 1987) . The total licensed nursing requirements converted to hours per resident day (HPRD) in a facility with 100 residents are around 0.30 HPRD , or 30 hours per day.
Most states have imposed additional requirements for minimum nursing standards. These standards are quite complex and vary considerably across states. In order to compare these standards, several steps must be taken. First, standards may apply to only one class of nursing personnel or to groups of personnel. Given that di¤erent categories of nurses may a¤ect quality of care di¤erently, I divide those standards into two categories: licensed nurses (LNs) and direct care nurses (DNs). LN includes registered nurses (RNs), licensed practical nurses (LPNs) and licensed vocational nurses (LVNs) while DN includes certi…ed nursing assistants (CNAs), or nursing assistants (NAs) who provide direct nursing care. Second, standards are set in di¤erent forms. 19 For simplicity those standards are converted to the hours per resident day for a 100 bed nursing facility.
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The federal government has set a minimum sta¢ ng requirement of 0.3 HPRD, regarded as the lower bound of the regulation for licensed nurses. There is no speci…c federal requirement with respect to direct care nurses. Up to 2005, 24 states, including the District of Columbia, had established a minimum sta¢ ng ratio for licensed nurses that was higher than the federal ratio. The remaining 27 states followed the federal licensed nurse sta¢ ng requirements. As for minimum sta¢ ng requirements for direct care nurses, 34 states have established their own standards to date. Regulations varied during our study period. Most of the changes were due to the adoption of minimum sta¢ ng ratio for either licensed nurses or direct care nurses. Ten of the states which did not have requirements for licensed nurses in 1996, when the dataset begins, adopted standards by 2005, when the dataset ends. Similarly, nine states established 19 Minimum nursing standards are expressed as either hours per resident day (HPRD), as a ratio of sta¤ to residents, or as a ratio of sta¤ to beds. In some cases, two formulations are used. For example, California requires 3.2 hours of direct care per resident day while Maine maintains a direct care sta¤-to-resident ratio of 1 to 5 during the day, 1 to 10 in the evening, and 1 to 15 at night. 20 More detailed discussion of the conversion can be found in .
requirements for direct care nurses during the time period studied here. During the course of this study, other states, including Arizona and Missouri, dropped their requirements on direct care nurse sta¢ ng ratios. Summary statistics on regulatory policies can be found in Table 1 . The state regulations cover many aspects of resident life, from specifying standards for the safe storage and preparation of food to protecting residents from physical or mental abuse or inadequate care practices. There are over 150 regulatory standards that nursing homes must meet at all times. Many are related.
22 Among the surveyors, there are trained health care professionals in nursing, nutrition, social work, pharmacy and sanitation.
surveyors then …ll in a standard form to determine whether various regulatory standards are being met for the visited nursing home.
The OSCAR data includes approximately 96 percent of all nursing facilities in the United
States. The dataset is considered the greatest source of reliable information about the U.S. nursing homes. However, there are limitations to the OSCAR data. 23 One concern is that OSCAR uses a snapshot method of surveyor observation, which may lead to inter-surveyor variations and inconsistencies. The problem is mitigated by the fact that all the surveyors have to strictly follow the federal standards for survey visits and …lling in survey forms.
Moreover, we rely on our model speci…cations to address the remaining survey variation issues, if there are any.
The number of nursing home providers is identi…ed through a nursing home's presence and absence from the OSCAR data. In case of a mismatch of the identi…cation number of a nursing home, I use detailed location information to match observations across years. Since each survey is done at an irregular interval of 9 to 15 months, our data identi…es the above variable for the time period of 1997 to 2004.
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The quality measure is based on the annual de…ciency citations at facility levels and is calculated as the market average over each nursing homes within each market. De…ciency citations are issued to facilities by state surveyors as a part of the federal survey process.
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There are 185 tags in total to cite, and each tag corresponds to one criterion related to the quality of nursing home care. If the surveyed nursing home fails to meet or violates one certain criterion, one corresponding de…ciency citation will be issued. More violations incur more citations and therefore indicate lower quality of care. 23 One concern is that each nursing home provides information on resident characteristics, and only some of the residents are selected to be veri…ed by the surveyors. This may cause the problem of measurement errors. Fortunately, these parts of the data are not used in this analysis. 24 For example, if a nursing home is not observed in the survey of 2005, I cannot identify whether it has exited the market in 2005 or it has not exited but its survey was going to be conducted sometime in 2006 (but I cannot observe the survey as our data ends at 2005). 25 The process and the outcomes of nursing home care in 15 major areas are assessed by state surveyors. Each of these areas has speci…c regulations which state surveyors review to determine whether or not facilities have met the standard. In July 1995, the Health Care Financing Administration consolidated the total of 325 tags (individual criteria) to a total of 185.
Some violations do not relate to nurse sta¢ ng levels, so do the corresponding citations issued as the result of those violations. 26 Since our main interest is to examine policy impacts of minimum sta¢ ng requirements, it's optimal to isolate those non-sta¢ ng related citations for the calculation of our quality measure. To do that, I …rst di¤erentiate between sta¢ ng and non-sta¢ ng related citations based on the detailed tag information of each citation. 27 I then focus on those sta¢ ng related citations in this study.
Besides the use of de…ciency citations, other quality measures in the literature include resource use and patient outcome. Both measures need to be adjusted using detailed information on the severity of patient illnesses at each nursing home. However, this information is hard and expensive to obtain and any unobserved information regarding severity of illness will lead to biased quality measures. Due to these reasons, de…ciency citations have become the most common quality measures (Mukamel and Spector (2003) ).
To provide a quantitative measure of quality, I …rst simply use the count of the total citations issued to each nursing home. Given that such measure ignores di¤erences in the severity of each violation, I therefore also calculate a value measure of de…ciency citations, which takes into account the scope and severity level of each citation. 28 This value measure follows a weighting method used by Gannett News Service where a score is assigned to each de…ciency based upon the citations'scope and severity.
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In the end, sta¢ ng related de…ciency citations provide two quality measures (Q_c and Q_v) to compare and evaluate quality of patient care in nursing homes nationwide. The variable Q_c is the count measure of sta¢ ng related de…ciency citations, and the variable Q_v is the value measure of those citations using a weighting method that takes into ac- 26 For example, an environment/cleaning violation will incur a citation, but it does not necessarily relate to nurse sta¢ ng levels.
27 Among all the tags, the following are considered as non-sta¢ ng related: F151-177 (resident rights), F201-208 (admission, transfer and discharge rights), F360-372 (dietary services), F385-390 (physician services), and F454-469 (physical environment).
28 E¤ective in July 1995, each de…ciency is also rated on its scope and severity. An alphabetic score (from A to L) is given to each de…ciency based on the combination of the de…ciency's scope and severity indicator. 29 For example, a de…ciency with a scope and severity of D is scored as a 5, whereas a de…ciency with a scope and severity of K receives a score of 45. More detailed information can be found at Matthews-Martin (2003) . count the di¤erential severity in violation. Similarly, the total de…ciency citations (including sta¢ ng and non-sta¢ ng related citations) provide two measures for overall quality (T _c and T _v). These two variables are used as instruments for the estimation of the dynamic speci…cation.
The unit of observation of this study is the county so that county-wide quality is measured as the average across nursing homes within a county. Not shown in this paper, another measure of the county-wide quality is weighted by the number of beds per facility and this alternative quality measure provides quite similar results.
Summary statistics are presented in Table 2 . Counties with missing values for demographics are deleted from the sample so that the data covers a total of 3,073 counties in the U.S. during the time period of 1997 to 2004. When it comes to the study of quality, the data covers 2,507 counties as observations which lack information on de…ciency citations or their severity levels are also dropped. 30 Note that I add negative sign to those log transformed quality measures so that higher value means higher quality of care. Also note that the value of zero for quality measures means no de…ciency citation, indicating the highest level of quality. Table 3 summarizes the variables discussed above. Each variable is measured at the county level. Observation=24,584.
ARF (2004) and Other Data
Empirical Speci…cation
The main goal of this study is to identify the e¤ects of minimum quality standards on outcomes of the nursing home market. Minimum sta¢ ng requirements serve as proxies for regulatory policies on minimum quality standards. Nurses are divided into two categories: licensed nurses and direct care nurses. State regulators may set minimum sta¢ ng requirements for either licensed nurses, or direct care nurses, or both. Minimum sta¢ ng requirements are measured both as binary policy dummies and as continuous measures of minimum nursing hours per patient day. The following work focuses on continuous measures; however, policy dummies provide very similar results.
Considering that observations within each state are likely to be dependent, all of the regressions are adjusted for clustering at state-year level. Failure to account for clustering may cause the researcher to greatly understate the standard errors on the estimated coe¢ cients 31 Certi…cate of Need and Moratorium policy allows the government to be involved in the process of establishing a new nursing home and change of bed capacity of an existing home. The policy claims to ration resources so that there will not be an uncontrolled growth of facilities.
for the state-level variables (Moulton (1990) ).
Several speci…cations are studied in this paper and they are detailed in the following discussion. The dynamic speci…cation, which comes last, is our main and preferred model.
Fixed E¤ect Speci…cation
The basic speci…cation uses a di¤erence-in-di¤erence methodology to estimate policy impacts. To be more speci…c, the outcome equation is written as: The inclusion of year dummies provides controls for unobserved national attributes that may a¤ect the dependent and the policy variables. The inclusion of market …xed e¤ects has two advantages. It provides controls for market (state) heterogeneity that may a¤ect the dependent variable, such as the quality of nursing home care. More importantly, it provides controls for unobserved time-invariant factors that may also relate to the policy changes across states.
Random Trends Speci…cation
The …xed e¤ect speci…cation takes control of unobserved heterogeneity but assumes they 32 States vary substantially in the stringency of nursing home regulations. Furthermore, some states have changed their regulations frequently enough that it is possible to use variation over time within states to control for state …xed e¤ects and to use variation across states within time to control for time-…xed e¤ects. I exploit this across-state and over-time variation in state regulations to examine the impact of minimum quality standards on behaviors of the nursing home market.
are unchanged over time. However, unobservables that are correlated to policy variables can vary within a state over time. For example, there may exist state speci…c trends that have caused more stringent inspections of de…ciency citations (hence lower the measure of quality) and more stringent minimum sta¢ ng requirements. Another simultaneity example is how increasing concern for quality of care has driven both policy changes and better quality of care. Or it might be the case where not more stringent policies, but increasing concern for quality of care has caused better quality of nursing care. Ignoring those unobservables would confound the estimates for policy impacts. To mitigate the bias, the following speci…cation adds market speci…c trends into the …xed e¤ect speci…cation where
Speci…cation (2) is also referred to as a random trend model. 33 This speci…cation captures the impact of policy changes on deviations of the left-hand side variables from their market growth paths. To estimate equation (2), the …rst-di¤erence is taken to get rid of i so that the equation is transformed to
and then equation (3) is estimated using the …xed e¤ects method to get rid of i .
Dynamic Speci…cation
The random trend speci…cation provides a more ‡exible way to control for heterogeneity in unobservables that may bias the estimation of 1 , but it restricts the market speci…c trends to follow a linear pattern for the purpose of identi…cation. To account for the possibility that some unobserved factors may exhibit more complex dynamic behavior, speci…cation (3) includes the lagged value of the dependent variable. Taking the analysis of quality as an example, the lagged quality of care captures state dependence in quality of care and provides a good proxy for factors determining policy changes. Given a statewide problem of deteriorating quality, the state government may be more likely to impose more stringent minimum sta¢ ng requirements as a remedy. Speci…cation (3) is given as follows:
Again the above equation is transformed to the equation below by taking the …rst-order di¤erence
and then the above equation is estimated using instruments for Y ist 1 .
Endogeneity Issues
There may exist other types of endogeneity that have not been addressed under speci…-cation (2) and (3). For example, there might be an artifact of a spurious correlation between the quality of nursing care and the propensity for a state to adopt or change its regulatory policies regarding minimum sta¢ ng requirements.
To further check for the existence of endogeneity problems in MQS policies, I include in speci…cation (2) and (3) an additional dummy variable for whether there will be any policy changes in the subsequent year. 34 Since two policy variables are examined in this study, I allow the dummy variable to be one whenever one policy variable has changed in the subsequent year. The estimated coe¢ cient on the lead dummy should be insigni…cant.
Otherwise, there should be concerns for reverse causality from the left-hand side variable to policy changes. The similar strategy has been employed by Gruber and Hanratty (1995) .
This section presents and discusses the estimation results. All of the regressions are clustered at state-year level. In the interest of length, coe¢ cients for time dummies are not presented. Table 4 examines the impacts of minimum sta¢ ng requirements on the number of nursing homes at the county level. Their impacts on quality of care is presented in Tables 6 and   7 , where Table 6 uses the number of de…ciency citations as the measure of quality and Table 7 uses the value measure of quality. In addition, Table 5 provides results for the extended models that include the policy lead dummy to test for the reverse causality of policy regulations.
E¤ects on the Number of Nursing Homes
Column 1 of Table 4 Column 2 shows the estimation results for speci…cation (1) using …xed e¤ects estimation.
By contrast to the OLS results, there are no longer any signi…cant negative e¤ects of Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement rates. Instead, we see a signi…cant negative e¤ect of minimum nursing hours of direct care nurses. Moreover, the positive e¤ect of licensed nurses is largely reduced in magnitude. This positive e¤ect could have di¤erent interpretations. It might re ‡ect the demand-expanding e¤ect that imposing minimum sta¢ ng requirements reduces uncertainty over quality of care and increases overall demand for nursing home care (Arrow, 1971) . It might as well just indicate an artifact of a spurious correlation between the number of nursing homes and regulatory policies regarding minimum nurse sta¢ ng.
Estimation of speci…cation (2) is presented in Column 3. Under this speci…cation, there are no longer any signi…cant impacts regarding minimum sta¢ ng requirements for licensed nurses and direct care nurses. Note that under this speci…cation, the identi…cation of policy impact relies on the deviation of the number of nursing homes from its market growth trend rather on the deviation from its market average level across time. Also note that this paper uses data covering 3,073 counties from 1997 to 2004, which gives us a total of 24,584 observations. Taking the …rst-order di¤erence leaves 21,511 observations under speci…cation (2).
The remaining columns are estimation results for speci…cation (3). Column 4 uses dl2:Y ist 2 , the di¤erence of the lagged two-period Y ist 2 and the lagged three-period Y ist 3 number of nursing homes, as an instrument for Y ist 1 . Column 5 uses Y ist 2 and Y ist 3 as instruments. The dynamic speci…cation has provided quite similar results compared to the random trend speci…cation. One striking di¤erence as compared to the FE speci…cation is that we see no evidence of any positive impacts from licensed nurses, indicating the importance of controlling for other sources of heterogeneity. Table 5 reexamines speci…cation (2) and (3) with the inclusion of the policy lead dummy.
The …rst two columns are results for the case where the dependent variable is the number of nursing home providers. The estimated coe¢ cients on the policy lead dummy are all very small in magnitude and in statistical signi…cance, suggesting that the causality goes from policy changes to the dependent variable.
In conclusion, policy variables have no signi…cant e¤ects on the number of nursing home providers. Although we cannot make any inferences regarding the e¤ects of regulations on the behavior of either the demand or the supply side based on our reduced form analysis, this insigni…cant impacts may be due to the fact that entry into the nursing home industry has been heavily regulated by state government. The imposition of minimum sta¢ ng requirements may increase overall demand for nursing home care. However, supply is regulated so that it fails to meet the increasing demand, or supply is decreased as minimum sta¢ ng requirements increase costs for the supply side. As a result, there is no signi…cant impact on the number of nursing homes.
Our …ndings also indicate that the size of the elderly population is an important determinant of the number of nursing homes. This result is quite robust across speci…cations.
Note here that the variable Certi…cate of Need program is dropped out of the analysis under speci…cation (3) because of the lack of variation within states during the sample period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) under speci…cation (3). As a result, its impact gets picked up by the state …xed e¤ects.
E¤ects on Quality
Quality of care has long been a hot debate in the nursing home industry. The imposition of minimum sta¢ ng requirements is aimed at improving quality of patient care. Whether this goal has been reached, and to what extent, will have profound policy implications.
Estimation results from various speci…cations are presented in Table 6 and 7 where quality is measured as the count of de…ciency citations and the value of citations respectively. Column 1 of both tables correspond to the basic …xed e¤ect speci…cation. Both regulatory policies are found to have no signi…cant impacts on quality.
The …xed e¤ects speci…cation (speci…cation (1)) takes into account the permanent di¤er-ences across states that are likely to be correlated with policy variables. One disadvantage of this speci…cation is that it assumes away time-varying individual attributes or unobservables. The ignorance of those time-varying attributes may have confounded the estimation of policy impacts if they are correlated with the regulatory policy changes across states and time. For example, states that have shown rising concern about quality of care may see both the adoption of quality regulations and lower quality measures (due to more stringent survey investigations). If this is the case, estimations of policy impacts will tend to be downward biased. Another example that will cause downward biased estimations is the selection problem: states with decreasing quality of care may be more likely to adopt quality regulations to improve quality. There are also cases where estimations would be upward biased. For example, a state may experience increasing demand for high quality of care, which could improve quality as well as increase a state's minimum sta¢ ng requirements. Without capturing this unobserved heterogeneity, it is unclear whether it is the minimum sta¢ ng requirement or the increasing demand for quality that has driven up quality of care.
Speci…cations (2) and (3) add controls for time-varying unobserved heterogeneity that has been assumed away by speci…cation (1). The results for speci…cation (2) are shown in
Column 2 of Table 6 and 7; and results of speci…cation (3) are listed in the remaining columns of both tables. Column 3 of Table 6 uses the lagged two-period quality measure Y ist 2 as an instrument for Y ist 1 ; Column 4 uses Y ist 2 and a lagged two-period overall quality measure as instruments. Note that throughout the paper, quality of care, as the dependent variable, is measured using sta¢ ng related de…ciency citations. The overall quality measure (using both sta¢ ng and nonsta¢ ng related de…ciency citations) is correlated to the measure of quality of care because they can be considered as decisions made within the same nursing facility, or as the survey outcomes delivered by the same survey team.
Using both the count and the value measures of de…ciency citations (those related to nurse sta¢ ng), I …nd signi…cant improvement in quality as the result of minimum sta¢ ng requirements for licensed nurses. To be more speci…c, results from the dynamic speci…cation
show that an extra half hour's sta¢ ng requirement for licensed nurses increases the quality level by 15 percent if quality is count-measured and by 20 percent if quality is value-measured.
This quality-increasing e¤ect is consistent with previous research …ndings that more licensed nurses improve quality. Note here that quality measures are rescaled so that a positive coe¢ cient indicates a quality increasing e¤ect. As opposed to the impact of licensed nurses, the estimated parameters for direct care nurses remain insigni…cant under speci…cation (2) and (3). More detailed discussion about this insigni…cant impact will be provided in the next section.
As a comparison between speci…cation (2) and (3), the estimated coe¢ cient for licensed nurses is larger in magnitude for the random trend speci…cation. As shown in Table 6 , the size of the coe¢ cient is 0.44 as opposed to 0.31, and the di¤erence is even bigger for the case (Table 7) where quality is measured taking into account di¤erential severity in levels of violation. To further examine which speci…cation should be preferred, we add the policy lead dummy to both speci…cations and the results are presented in Table 5 (Columns 3-6).
As shown in column 3 and 4 where quality is count measured, the coe¢ cients on the lead dummy are both insigni…cant. However, the coe¢ cient turns to be signi…cantly negative for the random trend speci…cation where quality is value measured (Column 5). This is most likely caused by an artifact of the correlation between policy variables and the quality measure. With the inclusion of the policy lead dummy, the measured coe¢ cient for licensed nurses shrinks to be closer to the one estimated under the dynamic specialization, validating the dynamic speci…cation as our preferred model.
Medicare Reimbursement rates are positively correlated to both measures of quality of care. The Medicaid reimbursement rate is found to have a negative e¤ect on quality. This …nding is opposite to some recent work such as Grabowski (2001) , but consistent with previous work such as Nyman (1985) and Gertler (1989) .
To sum up its impact on quality, the imposition of minimum sta¢ ng requirements improves quality of care. A half-hour increase of minimum sta¢ ng requirement for licensed nurses improve quality by 15 percent if quality is measured as de…ciency count, and by 20 percent if quality is measured as de…ciency value. The signi…cant quality-improving e¤ect of licensed nurses could be due to the fact that licensed nurses play a supervisory role, and it is very likely that increased sta¢ ng at licensed nurse levels is e¤ective in increasing quality of care. This result is consistent with previous …ndings.
35 35 Such as Cohen and Spector (1996) , Schnelle et al. (2004) , and Zhang and Grabowski (2004) .
By imposing a minimum lower bound, minimum quality standards (MQS) are intended to improve quality of the regulated product. Considering the important role that nurses play in providing quality health care, quality is expected to improve after the imposition of minimum sta¢ ng requirements. By examining the MQS separately for licensed nurses and direct care nurses, we …nd that whereas minimum sta¢ ng requirements for licensed nurses increase the quality of patient care, similar requirements for direct care nurses have no signi…cant impact.
Imposing minimum direct care nursing requirements does not necessarily improve quality.
One possible explanation is related to nursing homes'incentive to substitute cheaper laborers to reduce operating costs. Labor expenses constitute the largest component of a nursing home's operating expenses. The imposition of minimum sta¢ ng requirements increases labor costs and one unintended consequence is that nursing homes may compensate quality for quantity to maintain their labor costs. The di¤erence in policy impacts from licensed nurses and direct care nurses can be explained by the di¤erence between the two labor markets: nursing homes are more likely to hire cheap and less skilled substitutes for direct care nurses as compared to licensed nurses.
To become a certi…ed registered nurse, an individual has to obtain a degree in registered nursing (which normally takes 2-3 years to complete) and pass a national licensing examination. In this sense, the quality of licensed nurses can be guaranteed. nurses in ‡uences quality of care in the nursing home industry.
Another possible explanation for this outcome may be seen in how nursing homes strategically choose nursing inputs after the imposition of minimum sta¢ ng requirements in an industry su¤ering from asymmetric information problems. Imagine a model where patients cannot perfectly observe quality information and a nursing home has to set its sta¢ ng ratio a lot higher so as to distinguish itself from its competitors. Let's assume the di¤erence in sta¢ ng levels has to exceed one for di¤erentiation. But obtaining a high sta¢ ng ratio is costly. Consider a simple case with two nursing homes in the market, where sta¢ ng is zero for nursing home A and one for nursing home B. Now a minimum sta¢ ng regulation is imposed at the level of 0.5. Nursing home A increases its sta¢ ng just to the minimum required level at 0.5. Nursing home B can choose to be at level 1.5 so that patients will acknowledge its high quality or it can choose to lower its sta¢ ng to the minimum required level at 0.5. High labor costs and shortage of direct care nurses may deter B from hiring more and as a result, the new market equilibrium sta¢ ng is 0.5, which equals the equilibrium sta¢ ng before the imposition of the policy. This model can also be extended to the case where quality of care ends up lower as a result of minimum sta¢ ng requirements.
Had the model explained the di¤erences in policy impacts for the two types of nurses, we should expect more compressed variance in nursing inputs for direct care nurses after the imposition of minimum sta¢ ng requirements, but not for licensed nurses. Unfortunately, rates were below 40% in only 4 percent of states, and 60% or less in only 35 percent of states. CNA turnover rates exceed 60% in 65 percent of states, exceed 80% in 37 percent of states, and were above 100% in 20 percent of states." (Decker and et al., 2003) data on nursing inputs is not available for this study. Instead I rely on quality data based on de…ciency citations to provide some evidence. If it is the regulatory policies on the direct care nurse, but not the licensed nurse that reduce the variance in quality measure, the explanation based on the model seems plausible. To proceed, I focus on the value measure of quality which takes into account di¤erential severity levels in violation and I undertake empirical analysis both at the market level and at the state level. For market level analysis, the quality measure at the nursing facility level is used to calculate the standard deviation of quality at the county level. The standard deviation turns out to be signi…cantly smaller for markets with regulatory policies for both licensed nurses and direct care nurses. 37 I further run a regression of the standard deviation of quality on the two policies (dummies), including market level characteristics used in the main analysis. I've found that the imposition of minimum sta¢ ng requirements on direct care nurses, but not licensed nurses, signi…cantly reduces the size of the standard deviation of quality measures. This …nding seems to be consistent with the model discussed above, and it also explains the di¤erence in policy impacts for these two types of nurses.
In addition to the market level analysis, I also perform similar analysis at the state level. I use quality measures at the market level to calculate quality standard deviation at the state level and I …nd states with sta¢ ng requirements for direct care nurses have seen signi…cantly smaller standard deviation (the mean is 0.81 versus 0.88). Moreover, a …xed e¤ect regression with the inclusion of time and state dummies has shown that the imposition of minimum sta¢ ng requirements on direct care nurses is found to signi…cantly reduce standard deviations by 0.1, while sta¢ ng requirements for licensed nurses have no signi…cant impact on standard deviations. Based on the above analysis, we can conclude that policies for these two types of nurses seems to a¤ect the decisions of nursing homes in di¤erent ways. Given extra data on sta¢ ng input at nursing home level, further investigation on nursing homes' strategic interaction would provide more insightful policy implications.
Meanwhile, it's also interesting to explore how the extent of asymmetric information a¤ects strategic interactions among regulated …rms from a theoretical point of view.
Conclusion
This paper empirically examines the impacts of minimum sta¢ ng requirements on the nursing home market using a unique national panel during the time period of 1996 to 2005. The paper highlights the importance of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in examining policy impacts. It also shows that the extent to which one controls for unobserved heterogeneity considerably a¤ects the estimation results. The basic …xed e¤ect speci…cation deals with time-invariant heterogeneity but fails to provide consistent results due to the ignorance of heterogeneity from other sources. By contrast, the dynamic speci…cations have successfully provided more comprehensive controls for unobserved heterogeneity. The estimation reveals a quality-improving e¤ect from the minimum sta¢ ng of licensed nurses: a half-hour increase in the minimum sta¢ ng requirement increases quality by 15 percent. Equivalently, it means one standard deviation increase of minimum licensed nursing hours will improve quality by four percent. There is no evidence of any e¤ect from the minimum sta¢ ng of direct care nurses. This …nding has an important policy implication: mandating the quantity of direct care nursing does not guarantee quality of care. 
